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1. Introduction
The division of labor, a central concept in economic analysis since the time of
Adam Smith, has two aspects: (i) the division of labor within firms and (ii) the division
of labor between firms. The former is concerned with the range of tasks performed by
workers within any particular firm, while the latter deals with the range of products that
any particular firm produces. Whereas these two developments have proceeded in
tandem in the past, over the past decade there has been a well-documented tendency for
them to move in opposite directions. On the one hand, the progressive specialization
between firms continues, as large numbers of businesses in both the manufacturing and
the service sectors concentrate more heavily on their "core competencies" in product
lines. On the other hand, there is evidence of a progressive breakdown of occupational
barriers within many firms, as corporate hierarchies are restructured and delayered, and
workers are given wider ranges of responsibilities across tasks. Thus an increased
division of labor between firms is often accompanied by a reduced division of labor
within firms. These broad, widespread changes are documented in a growing body of
empirical literature (summarized in the next section), though it is of course possible to
find many specific cases where these generalizations do not apply.
This paper focuses on the division of labor  within  firms, examining the
contemporary change in work organization away from the traditional “Tayloristic
firms,” with highly specialized workers in functional departments (e.g. production,
administration, finance, design, and marketing departments) towards “holistic firms”
with multi-tasking and job rotation within relatively small customer-oriented teams. The
purpose of this paper is (a) to identify some major determinants of this change and
highlight some important channels whereby these determinants work, and (b) to explore
some implications of this change for the labor market and the distribution of firms
across organizational forms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some empirical
evidence for the above organizational changes. Section 3 presents a simple model of
work organization and examines how changes in the division of labor within firms can
be driven by changes in the determinants of the organization of work. Section 4 presents
the wage and employment decisions in this context and describes the labor market
equilibrium, given the number of holistic and Tayloristic organizations. Section 5
allows restructuring of organizations and the entry of new firms, and examines theTHE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     2
associated organizational equilibrium. Section 6 shows how advances in production and
information technologies and changes in human capital and worker preferences can
drive the restructuring process, whereby Tayloristic organizations turn into holistic ones
and new holistic organizations enter the economy. In this context, we examine how this
process can lead to a resegmentation of the labor market. Finally Section 7 concludes.
2. The Empirical Picture
Until recently, the empirical evidence of reorganization of work within firms was
based on a large number of case studies.
1 Since the process is highly complex, and also
gradual and uneven among firms and countries, it has been long before convincing,
systematical empirical studies has emerged. The quantitative importance of the process,
and its various parts, has therefore been uncertain. Nevertheless, various aspects of the
process have been examined analytically in the economics literature.
2
However, systematic representative empirical studies are now available. Studies
for Japan established long ago the characteristics of new types of work organization,
sometimes baptized "The Toyota model" (e.g. Aoki, 1984). Recent studies for the
United States and Europe have documented that reorganization of work is a wide-
ranging phenomenon in these parts of the world as well. For instance, a representative
study by Osterman (1994) documents the process in U.S. manufacturing establishments
(with 50 or more employees). One conclusion is that 55 percent of the establishments
were using work teams, 43 percent work rotation, 34 percent "total quality control"
(TQM) and 41 percent quality circles; only 21 percent had none of these features.
3
There is also evidence that these features are new phenomena. About half of the
observed arrangements were introduced less than five years prior to the survey year of
1992.
4
                                                
1 See, for example, Appelbaum and Bott (1994), Hammer and Champy (1993), Pfeiffer (1994), and
Wikstrom and Norman (1994).
2 See for instance,  Carmichael and MacLeod (1993),  Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), Kramer and
Mishkin (1995), Lindbeck and Snower (1996), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), and Yang and Borland
(1991).
3 For firms in which at least 50 percent of the workforce was engaged in such activities, the corresponding
percentage figures are 41, 27,  24,  27 and 36.
4 49 percent of the teams, 38 percent of the job rotation practices, 71 percent of TQM programs and 68
percent of problem-solving groups or quality circles were introduced in the period 1986-1992. These
results are broadly consistent with a study for a sample of large firms by Lawler, Mohrman and Ledford
(1992), according to which 66 percent of the firms in the sample have quality circles, 47 percent have
self-managed work teams and 64 percent have TQM.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     3
Employee participation in decision-making within firms seems also to have
increased in major West European countries (OECD, 1996,  Chapt. 6). Indeed in a
systematic questionnaire study among managers in this part of the world, four out of
five firms report that they have taken steps in this direction (European Foundation,
1997).
The most comprehensive documentation so far of the quantitative importance of
the shifts to more flexible work organization apparently pertains to the Nordic countries
(NUTEK, 1996 and 1999). These studies indicate that the majority of establishments
(with more than 50 employees) in all Nordic countries – specifically, 68-75 percent of
these establishments – moved to more flexible organization of work during the 1990s
(NUTEK, 1999, Chapt. 4).
5 The most important elements of these reorganizations are
delegation of responsibility to production workers, organized developments of human
capital (training), team-work, job-rotation, and multi-tasking (reflected in an increase in
the average number of tasks per employee). Daily planning of one's own work has been
decentralized to individuals in 57 percent of Swedish establishments, and to work teams
in 38 and 25 percent, respectively (NUTEK, 1999 chapt. 2). The figures for quality
control and weekly planning of one's own work are somewhat lower, and for customer
relations and maintenance considerably lower.
6 Internal information circulation within
firms is also reported to have increased. Within the teams, informal work rotation
(multi-tasking) is recorded in about a fifth of the studied firms. Another finding is that
the education level among the employees is higher in reorganized firms than in
traditional firms.
In short, there is now empirical evidence of quantitatively important
reorganizations of work within firms, resulting in increased responsibilities for both
production workers and white-collar workers. In particular, these groups are
increasingly assigned the task to organize, administer and maintain their own work,
organize training, take new initiative; maintain work norms, often within teams that
allocate and co-ordinate tasks among the team members; take responsibility for product
specification and product quality; negotiate with customers etc. Thus, multi-task
                                                
5 If work places with 10-49 employees are included, the proportion of reorganized work places decreases
with about 20 percentage points.
6 For customer relations, the corresponding figure in Sweden (Finland) is 36 (19) percent in the case of
individuals, and 13 (7) percent in the case of teams. For maintenance, the figure for Sweden (Finland) is
28 (10) percent in the case of individuals and 23 (9) percent in the case of teams.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     4
activities and job rotation are important characteristics of the emerging new
organization of work.
3. A Simple Model of Work Organization and Restructuring
For simplicity, consider a firm that employs two workers at two tasks (1 and 2)
to produce a homogeneous output q. The first worker devotes the proportion t of his
available time to task 1 (and (1-t) to task 2), while the second worker devotes the
proportion T to task 2 (and (1-T) to task 1). Let e1 and e2 be the first worker’s labor
endowment (labor input in efficiency units) at tasks 1 and 2, respectively; and let E1 and
E2 be the second worker’s labor endowment at these two tasks. Denoting the labor
services at the two tasks by  111 (1) eE lt =+-T  and  222 (1) eE lt =-+T , the production
function is
( ) 12 , qf ll = ,  f1, f2 > 0, f11, f22 < 0 (1)
The workers’ labor is assumed to enter the production function symmetrically, so that
we can restrict our attention to the first worker.
The worker’s labor endowment ei (i = 1,2) at each task i depends on:
(i) the return to specialization: the more time a worker devotes to a task, the more
productive he becomes, due to learning by doing, and
(ii) the informational task complementarity: the more time a worker devotes to one task,
the more productive he becomes at another task, since he is able to use the information
acquired at the former task to improve his performance at the latter.
It will be possible to derive simple, intuitively appealing conditions for the firm’s choice
of work organization if we specify these two phenomena in constant-elasticity terms.





h st = (2a)
where 
s
11  and  sh  are positive constants. In words, the returns to specialization at task 1
increase in the amount of time spent at this task.








                                                
7 These returns of course accrue only with the passage of time but, for analytic simplicity, we ignore this
temporal dimension in our model.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     5
where  11  and 
c ch  are positive constants, i.e. the greater the amount of time the worker
spends at task one, the less time is available for task 2, and thus the smaller the
informational task complementarity flowing from task 2 to task 1.
Let the worker’s labor endowment at task 1 be
e1 = s1c1 (3)
Another aspect of the firm’s production technology that plays an important role











=„ , i.e. the elasticity of the marginal product of one task with
respect to the other task, which we assume constant.
Let the firm’s cost of production be  ( ) ( ) wnWN kt =+T, where w and W are
the wages of the type-1 and type-2 workers, respectively. In general these wages depend
on the time allocations t and T since workers have preference concerning specialization
versus versatility at work. For simplicity, we assume that this cost function is symmetric
across the two types of workers. The firm’s profit is
  p = q - k - fi (4)
where fi is a constant restructuring cost (to be described in the next section).
The firm makes the employment decisions n and N, and the time allocation decisions
t and T, so as to maximize profit.
The first-order conditions for maximizing profit with respect to the time
allocation are ( ) /0 ¶p¶t ‡  and ( )( ) /10 ¶p¶tt -=  where
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In this context, if ( ) /0 ¶p¶t =  for 01 t <<, and ( )
22 /0 ¶p¶t < , then the worker will
be engaged in multi-tasking; otherwise the worker will specialize by task.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     6
Within this framework of analysis it is straightforward to show that Tayloristic
firms have an incentive to restructure along holistic lines in response to the following
changes (naturally, provided the changes are sufficiently large):
•  increases in informational task complementarities that increase the absolute value of
the elasticity  hj
c
, j=1,2;
•  technological improvements that raise the elasticity eij, for i„ j;
•  advances in human capital that enable workers to become more versatile (viz., an
increase of  2() sx  relative to  1() sx, for any positive x, 01 x ££ ); and
•  changes in worker preferences that reduce their reservation wage for versatile work
relative to that for specialized work (viz., an increase in  w'(t) for  t < ½, and a
reduction in w'(t) for t > ½).
We hypothesize that changes along these lines are behind the empirically observed
changes in the organization of work. An example of the first change is the introduction
of computerized information systems that give employees easy access to task
information within their firms and thereby encourage the exercise of multiple skills. An
example of the second change is the application of flexible machine tools and
programmable equipment that makes different skills more complementary to one
another. Education and training are likely to contribute to the third and fourth types of
change.
To gain insight into the determinants of the firm’s work organization in the
analytical context above, it is useful to begin with the special case in which both types
of workers are “completely versatile,” in the sense that each worker is equally
productive at both tasks. For the type-1 worker this means  12 ()()() sxsxsx ==  and
12 ()()() cycycy ==  for any positive  x and  y,  0,1 xy ££ . By our assumption of
symmetry,  12 ' fff ==,  1122 ii eee == ,  12
sss hhh ==,  12
ccc hhh == and  1221 ij eee ==  for
ij „ . In this context, the following two propositions identify the determinants of the
firm’s work organization under specific conditions.
Proposition 1: If the marginal products of labor are constant ( 0 ij e =  for i, j = 1,2),
then the organization of work depends only on the returns to specialization relative to
the informational task complementarity. In particular, when h
s + h
c < 0 there is multi-
tasking, and when h
s + h
c > 0 there is complete specialization.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     7
Proposition 2 : Suppose that the returns to specialization and the associated
informational task complementarities
8 are equally responsive to changes in the fraction
of available time devoted to the relevant task (i.e.  0
sc hh += ), then the organization of
work depends only on the technological task complementarity relative to diminishing
returns to labor. In particular, when  ijii ee > , for ij „ , there is multi-tasking; and when
ijii ee < , for ij „ , there is complete specialization.
(The proofs are given in the Appendix A.)
Proposition 1 states that, under constant returns to labor, work will be
specialized by task when an increase in the time spent at a task raises the productivity of
labor at that task by more than it raises the productivity of labor at another task,
9 i.e.
when  h
s +  h
c >  0. Conversely, there will be multi-tasking when an increase in
experience at a task raises the informational task complementarities by more than the
returns to specialization, i.e. when h
s + h
c < 0. Thus technological improvement that
reduce h
c
 (and thus increase the absolute value of  h
c) give the firm an incentive to
organize work along holistic lines.
To get an intuitive understanding of this, it is convenient to visualize the firm’s
profit maximization problem in terms of an opportunity locus and an isoquant in  12 ll -
space, as shown in Figures 1. In particular, the opportunity locus (OL) is given by
111 (1) eE lt =+-T  and  222 (1) eE lt =-+T , and the isoquant ( IQ) is given by
( ) 12 , fq ll =  (a constant). The firm’s problem is to choose the time allocation t so as
to reach the highest isoquant achievable along its opportunity locus. It can be shown
that when  0
sc hh +> , the opportunity locus OL is convex (in Figure 1a). If  0 ij e =  for i,
j = 1,2, then the isoquant IQ is linear in  12 ll -  space. When workers are completely
versatile, the opportunity locus is symmetric in  12 ll -  space, and by our symmetry
assumption across tasks, the isoquant is symmetric in the same sense. Then highest
                                                
8 In other words, the returns to specialization at task i and the informational task complementarity flowing
from task j to task i, where i „ j.
9 In other words, there will be complete specialization when an increase in experience at a task raises the
proportional returns to specialization at that task by more than it raises the associated informational task
complementarities.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     8
isoquant is reached at the two end-points of the opportunity locus:  ( ) ( ) 21 0, and ,0 ll ,
which implies complete specialization, as shown in Fig. 1a.
10
On the other hand, when  0
sc hh +< , the opportunity locus OL is concave, as
illustrated in Figure 1b. Then, clearly, the highest linear isoquant is attained in the
interior of the opportunity locus, at  ( )
**
12 , ll in the figure. This implies multi-tasking,
with t
* = 1/2 in this special case.
Proposition 2 states that if an increase in the fraction of time devoted to a task
raises the returns to specialization at that task by the same proportional amount as the
associated informational task complementarities ( 0
sc hh += ), the organization of work
will involve complete specialization when the marginal product of labor service  i (
i=1,2) diminishes more rapidly with labor service j (ji „ ) than with labor service  i:
ijii ee < . Conversely, there will be multi-tasking when  ijii ee > . Thus technological
improvements that raise the elasticity eij, for i„ j, provide an incentive for holistic work
organization.
It can be shown that if  0
sc hh += , the opportunity locus OL  is linear; and if
ijii ee < , the  isoquant IQ  is concave to the origin, as shown in Figure 1c. Thus, the
highest isoquant is once again attained at the end-points of the opportunity, and workers
will specialize by task. However, if  ijii ee > , the  isoquant is convex to the origin, as
illustrated in Figure 1d. Here the highest isoquant is reached in the interior of the linear
opportunity locus, so that workers engage in multi-tasking.
We are now in a position to embed our analysis of work organization into a
simple model of the labor market.
4. Wage and Employment Determination
Let us examine how the reorganization of work leads to a resegmentation of the
labor market, in which the traditional occupational (task-oriented) boundaries break
down and the distinction between versatile workers (who can perform multiple tasks)
and non-versatile ones (who can perform only one) becomes more important instead.
                                                
10Needless to say, this solution should not be characterized as one of multiple equilibria. Rather, when the
workers are completely versatile, both types of workers are identical, and thus the firm finds it
worthwhile to devote half its workforce to task 1 and the other half to task 2.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     9
For this purpose, it now becomes appropriate to differentiate workers in terms of their
degree of versatility. For expositional simplicity, it will be convenient to assume that
workers of type  i (i=1,2) can each be divided into two distinct groups: “versatile
workers” who are capable of both tasks and “non-versatile workers” who are capable of
only one.
The labor endowment of a type-1 versatile worker at task i (i = 1,2) is that
described above:  ,1,2 iii esci =￿= .
11 The labor endowment of non-versatile type-1
workers is  111 (1)(0) esc =￿.
12
Let a fixed proportion  a  of  the working population be able to perform task 1
and an identical proportion be able to perform task 2. Of the groups of workers able to
perform one particular task, a fixed proportion  b  is also able to perform the other task.
Letting the working population be denoted by L, the aggregate supply of versatile type-1
workers ( 1
v A ) and versatile type-2 workers ( 2
v A ) is  12
vv AAL ab == , and the aggregate
supply of non-versatile type-1 ( 1
s A ) and non-versatile type-2 workers ( 2
s A ) is
( ) 12 1
ss AAL ab ==-￿ . We assume that holistic organizations require only versatile
workers, whereas the Tayloristic ones are able to use both versatile and non-versatile
ones.
We make the standard assumption that the wage and employment decisions are
made in two stages: first the wage is set through bargaining between each firm and its
employees, taking the employment repercussions into account; then the employment
decisions are made, taking the wage as given. Since this paper does not seek to make a
contribution to the wage bargaining literature, we will simply adopt a standard
specification of a wage bargaining equation (yielded by a variety of union and other
bargaining models, as well as various efficiency wage models). Specifically, we
suppose that the negotiated wage depends inversely on the unemployment rate and










=<> , where uj is the
unemployment rate ( ( ) 1/
DS
jjj uNN ”- ,
D
j N  is the aggregate demand, and 
S
j N  is  the
aggregate supply), and  rr is the reservation wage (at which workers are indifferent
                                                
11 We continue to assume, for simplicity, that the versatile type-1 and type-2 workers have symmetric
comparative advantages across tasks.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     10
between employment unemployment), for any homogenous group j of workers.
13 We
assume that versatile workers have a higher reservation wage for Tayloristic jobs than
for holistic ones. In particular each versatile worker’s reservation wage at Tayloristic
jobs is r





Next, consider the equilibrium in the labor market, taking the number of
Tayloristic organizations (FT) and the number of holistic ones (FH) as given. To capture
some common differences between holistic and Tayloristic organizations in practice, we
parameterize our model so that, in the labor market equilibrium,
14 employment per
Tayloristic organization exceeds employment per holistic organization
(
****
 and N THTH nnN >> ), and  the holistic wage exceeds the Tayloristic wage
(
****
 and  HTHT wwWW >> ).
15 Since the holistic wage is higher than the Tayloristic wage
in the labor market equilibrium and since versatile workers have a preference for
holistic over Tayloristic work, the aggregate supply of workers
16 available to the holistic
firms is the aggregate supply of versatile workers of that type, abL.
17
For expositional brevity, the aggregate labor market equilibrium is illustrated in
Figure 2, and the algebraic description is relegated to Appendix B. On the horizontal
axis, aggregate Tayloristic employment,  ( )
***
TTTT LFnN =￿+  is measured from left to
                                                                                                                                              
12 Similarly for the type-2 worker. In words, a non-versatile worker has the endowment that a versatile
worker would have if he performed only the first task.
13 Holistic organizations, as noted, employ only the versatile workers. By symmetry, the type-1 and type-
2 versatile workers have the same marginal product and the same reservation wage and thus receive the
same wage. In Tayloristic organizations the marginal products of  versatile and non-versatile type-1
workers are identical (and similarly for the type-2 workers), and we assume that these organizations pay
the same wage to workers from both groups. (Allowing them to pay different wages to versatile and non-
versatile workers would make no substantial difference to our conclusions.)
14 The implications of dropping these assumption are described below.
15This requires that the fixed costs of production (described below) have the following properties: (i) the
fixed cost f T of operating the Tayloristic organization must be sufficiently large relative to the fixed cost
f H of operating the holistic organization or (ii) the number of versatile workers is sufficiently small
relative to the number of non-versatile ones, or both. To see this, observe that (as we will show in the next
section) the greater is the fixed cost f T relative to f H, the smaller will be the equilibrium number of
Tayloristic organizations relative to the number of holistic ones. Consequently, the larger will be the size
of the Tayloristic organization in terms of employment relative to that of the holistic organization, and the
lower will be the Tayloristic wage relative to the holistic wage. Moreover, the smaller is the holistic labor
supply  relative to the Tayloristic one, the greater will be the equilibrium holistic wage relative to the
Tayloristic one.
16This is the supply of type-1 workers. Recall that the symmetry properties above permit us to focus just
on type-1 workers.
17 Under these circumstances, the labor market equilibrium can be derived recursively: the holistic
equilibrium may be computed first, and this equilibrium then determines the supply of labor to the
Tayloristic market, whose equilibrium may be derived next.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     11
right, and aggregate holistic employment,  ( )
***
HHHH LFnN =￿+ , is measured from right





H L , respectively; and the associated wage setting curves
18 are denoted by WST and
WSH. The total working age population (measured from left to right) is given by L.
The equilibrium wage and employment level in the Tayloristic (holistic) sector
is given by the intersection between the aggregate Tayloristic (holistic) labor demand
curve and the corresponding wage setting curve. The workers not employed in either the
Tayloristic or holistic sectors are unemployed; the equilibrium unemployment level is
denoted by U* in the figure.
This is our picture of a segmented labor market. Note that the segmentation does
not follow the traditional lines that distinguish between skilled and unskilled workers,
unionized and non-unionized workers, and so on, but rather the segmentation is related
to the organization of work. On this basis, we will later examine how the process of
reorganizing work can lead to a “resegmentation” of the labor market.
The above labor market equilibrium is derived for a given number of holistic
and Tayloristic organizations. The next step in our analysis is to examine the market for
these organizations.
5. Equilibrium in the Market for Organizations
To model the restructuring process and determine the equilibrium number of
holistic and Tayloristic organizations, we need to explain the conditions when
organizations of each type enter and exit from the economy and when organizations
restructure. For this purpose, we distinguish between three sets of fixed costs:
19
(i) the fixed costs expended by incumbent firms to remain in operation: fH for a holistic
firm and fT for a Tayloristic one (where fT and fH are positive constants);
20
(ii) the fixed costs of reorganization: rTH  for a Tayloristic organization to restructure
into a holistic one, and rHT for a holistic firm to become a Tayloristic one (where rTH
and rHT are positive constants); and
                                                
18 Observe that the wage setting curve WST has a discontinuity at (1-ab)L, since the reservation wage
associated with Tayloristic work is assumed to be higher for versatile workers than for non-versatile ones.
19 These costs are represented f i by in the profit function (4), above.
20 Since Tayloristic firms usually have greater returns to scale (ceteris paribus), we will assume that f H <
f F.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     12
(iii) the fixed costs of entry: qH to enter the holistic sector and qT to enter the Tayloristic
one (where qH and qT are positive constants).
We assume, plausibly, that fH < rTH, qH and fT < rHT, qT.
Entry into the holistic organization market proceeds until the profit of the entrant
is reduced to zero:
21
* 0 EH P= (6a)
The number of firms  H H FF = , which fulfills this condition may be called the
“minimum sustainable number of holistic organizations”, since any smaller number
would induce the entry of new holistic organizations. Similarly, the entry condition for
the Tayloristic organization market is
* 0 ET P= (6b)
The value  T T FF =  which fulfills this condition may be termed the “minimum
sustainable number of Tayloristic organizations.”
Reorganization of Tayloristic organizations into holistic ones proceeds until the
profit from continuing to operate a Tayloristic organization is equal to that from
transforming into a holistic one:
**
TTH P=P (6c)
The value  TT FF =  which fulfills the reorganization condition may be called the
“maximum sustainable number of Tayloristic organizations”, since any greater number
would induce Tayloristic organizations to transform into holistic ones. Similarly, the
holistic reorganization condition is
**
HHT P=P (6d)
and  H F  is the “maximum sustainable number of holistic organizations”.
The market for organizations is in equilibrium whenever the number of holistic
organizations lies between its maximum and minimum sustainable levels and similarly
for the number of Tayloristic organizations:
*
H HH FFF ££  and   
*
T TT FFF ££ (7)
                                                
21 The algebraic expressions of the entry and restructuring conditions for the linearized labor demand and
wage setting equations are given in Appendix B.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     13
If, on the other hand, this condition is not satisfied, then the number of organizations
will change. (For example, if 
*
H H FF < , then  the number of holistic organizations
increases.)
Figure 3 provides an illustrative example of a range of equilibria in the market
for organizations. On the horizontal axis, the number of Tayloristic organizations is
measured from left to right, and the number of holistic organizations is measured from
right to left. 
***
,, and  THTET PPP  are the profit curves of Tayloristic firms in operation,
firms that have turned into Tayloristic firms, and Tayloristic firms that have just entered
the economy, respectively. These curves are all downward sloping (measured from left
to right). The reason is that, in Figure 2, if the number of holistic firms increases, the
aggregate holistic labor demand curve
D
H L  shifts upwards, raising the equilibrium
holistic wage 
*
H w  and reducing profit 
*
H p  of each holistic firm.
22 The figure
presupposes that the costs of entry exceed the costs of restructuring from holistic to
Tayloristic organization (thus HTH qr >  and  THT qr > ). For this reason the 
*
H P  curve
lies above the 
*
TH P  curve, which in turn lies above the 
*
EH P  curves.
Similarly, the profit curves 
***
,, and  HTHEH PPP  for each holistic scenario also
show an inverse relation between profit and the number of holistic firms. Once again,
the figure assumes that the costs of entry exceed the costs of restructuring, now from
Tayloristic to holistic organization.
In the figure, for example, every combination 
**
(,) HT FF lying within the interval
between  T F  and  H F  in the figure may be an organizational equilibrium.
23 Beginning
from such an equilibrium, the next section investigates the forces inducing
reorganization and entry into the holistic sector and explores the implications of these
developments for the labor market.
6. The Restructuring Process and the Labor Market
We now analyze how the major forces driving the restructuring process -
advances in production and information technologies, and improvements in human
                                                
22 For simplicity, the profit curves are drawn for just one of the segments of the wage setting curve. Over
both segments, clearly, the profit curves would have a kink.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     14
capital - influence the labor market. Once again, for brevity, we illustrate our results in
figures, leaving algebra to Appendix B.
We consider two types of sustained advances in production and information
technologies: ones that increase the technological and informational task
complementarities (as described in Section 2) and ones that reduce the holistic fixed
cost fH (while the Tayloristic fixed cost fT remains unchanged).
How these changes affect the labor market depends on whether the restructuring
condition (6c) or the entry condition (6a) is binding in the initial equilibrium.
24
Specifically, our analysis above has the following implications:
Proposition 3: Consider technological advances that (a) increase the technological and
information task complementarities, (b) reduce the fixed cost of operating holistic
organizations, and (c) increase the number of versatilel workers. These advances have
the following effects on the labor market above.
1. Suppose that the restructuring condition (6c) is binding in the initial equilibrium.
(a) Then the above technological advances lead first to a “restructuring phase”, in
which Tayloristic organizations are transformed into holistic ones: the high-wage
holistic sector expands, the lower-wage Tayloristic sector contracts, and unemployment
expands.
 (b) This is followed by an “entry phase”, in which new holistic organizations enter the
economy: the high-wage holistic sector continues to expand, the lower-wage Tayloristic
sector remains constant, and unemployment contracts.
2. Now suppose that the entry condition (6a) is binding in the initial equilibrium.
Then the above technological advances lead directly to the entry phase.
To see t his, observe that advances that increase the technological and
informational task complementarities or that reduce the fixed cost of operating holistic
organizations cause the profit curves 
**
, and  THEH PP  to rise through time, while the
profit curve 
*
T P  remains unchanged, as shown in Figure 4. Furthermore, increases in the
supply of versatile workers, induced through education and training, leads to a fall the
holistic wage setting curve (by raising the supply of workers to holistic firms).
Consequently, the profit curves 
**
, and  THEH PP  again rise. Under these circumstances, if
the economy is initially in an organizational equilibrium, determined by condition (7),
                                                                                                                                              
23There is of course no reason why the FH  point should necessarily lie to the left of the  F T  point, or why
the FH  point should necessarily lie to the left of the FT  point.
24 As shown in Figure 3, a necessary condition for the restructuring condition to be binding is that the
entry cost exceeds the restructuring cost. Furthermore, a sufficient condition for the entry condition to be
binding is that the restructuring cost exceeds the entry cost.THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     15
then it eventually will become worthwhile for Tayloristic organizations to be
restructured into holistic ones and/or new holistic firms to enter.
Suppose that the restructuring condition (6c) is binding in the initial equilibrium,
so that the technological changes above lead some Tayloristic firms to turn into holistic
ones. In Figure 4, the profit curve P
*
TH of the restructured organizations rises to P’TH,
while the profit curve 
*
T P  of incumbent Tayloristic organizations remains unchanged.
As result, the intersection between these two curves shifts to the left, increasing the
number of holistic organizations and reducing the number of Tayloristic ones.
The increase in the number of holistic organizations shifts the holistic labor
demand curve upward in Figure 2. Consequently, the equilibrium holistic wage rises
and the equilibrium level of aggregate holistic employment rises as well.
The fall in the number of Tayloristic organizations FT
*, associated with the rise
in the number of holistic organizations  FH
*, reduces the equilibrium aggregate
Tayloristic employment and also reduces the equilibrium Tayloristic wage.
25 In terms of
Figure 2, the Tayloristic labor demand curve shifts downward, and the Tayloristic labor
supply curve shifts to the left. If the number of non-versatile workers is large, the
Tayloristic equilibrium lies at the intersection of the labor demand curve and the lower
segment of the wage setting curve, and then equilibrium employment and the wage in
the Tayloristic sector both fall. If, on the other hand, the number of non-versatile
workers is small, the Tayloristic equilibrium lies at the intersection of the labor demand
curve and the upper segment of the wage setting curve, and then the Tayloristic wage
setting curve will shift upwards in response to the rise in holistic employment. As result,
Tayloristic employment will fall by more and the Tayloristic wage will fall by less than
in the previous scenario.
Assuming that employment per Tayloristic organization exceeds the
employment per holistic organization and that the unemployment rate among single-
skill workers exceeds that among the versatile ones, the rise in aggregate holistic
employment will be less than the corresponding fall in Tayloristic employment, and
hence unemployment rises.
                                                
25 If the number of non-versatile workers is sufficiently large to satisfy the Tayloristic labor demand, then
the fall in Tayloristic employment is driven solely by the fall in the number of Tayloristic organizations.
Yet if the number of non-versatile workers is small enough to make it necessary for the Tayloristic
organizations to hire some versatile workers, then the employment decline in the Tayloristic sector is also
driven by the rise in the number of holistic organizations, which reduces the labor supply to the
Tayloristic organizations and shifts the wage setting equation upwards (since the reservation wage rises).THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     16
As technological progress shifts the profit curves 
**
, and  THEH PP  upwards by
equal amounts while leaving the profit curve 
*
T P  unchanged, the restructuring of
Tayloristic into holistic organizations will eventually be replaced by entry of new
holistic organizations. In terms of our model, this means that the entry condition (6a)
becomes binding, replacing the restructuring condition (6c).
It is easy to see why. Given the number of holistic and Tayloristic organizations,
the technological progress above raises an organization’s profit from entry into the
holistic sector by the same amount as the profit from restructuring a Tayloristic
organization into a holistic one, since the gross holistic profit (
*
H p ) remains unchanged.
But as the number of holistic organizations increases, an organization’s profit from
entry into the holistic sector falls at a slower rate than the profit from restructuring a
Tayloristic organization into a holistic one. The reason is that, as the restructuring
process reduces the number of Tayloristic organizations, the profit of each remaining
incumbent Tayloristic organization rises (since the wage in the Tayloristic sector falls),
and this provides a disincentive to restructure. There is no corresponding disincentive to
enter the holistic sector.
This is illustrated in Figure 4. Here we consider an initial equilibrium at Point A,
where the marginal organization entering the holistic sector makes zero profit, and the
marginal Tayloristic organization that restructures into a holistic one makes zero profit
as well. Then the technological change raises the profit curve 
*   EH P  by the same amount
as the profit curve 
*
TH P . Thus, the magnitude of the upward shift from 
*'
 to  EHEH PP  in
the figure is equal to the magnitude of the upward shift of the profit curve from
*'
 to  THTH PP .
The restructuring process moves the economy from Point A to B in the figure
(i.e. the number of holistic organizations increases by AB and the number of Tayloristic
organizations falls by an equal amount). But at Point B there are still positive profits to
be made from entering the holistic sector. The reason is that the intersection of the profit
curve PEH with the horizontal axis shifts to the left by a larger amount (from Point A to
C) than the intersection of the profit curve PTH with the profit curve PT (from Point A
to Point B). Consequently, the number of holistic organizations increases by 
*
H F D  = BC
in the figure. Since the aggregate number of organizations has increased by 
*
H F D , the
left-hand vertical axis shifts leftwards by an equal amount, pulling the TayloristicTHE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     17
incumbent organization’s profit curve leftwards by an equal amount as well (from
*'
 to  TT PP  in the figure).
At Point C, however, the profit from restructuring a Tayloristic into a holistic
organization (given by 
'
TH P ) is less than the profit from remaining a Tayloristic
organization (given by 
'
T P ). Thus when the technological progress in the following
period shifts the holistic profit curves upwards again, only entry into the holistic sector -
but no restructuring - will take place.
On the other hand, if the entry condition is binding in the initial equilibrium,
then – by the analysis above – the technological changes above will ensure that the
entry condition remains binding. Then, as the holistic profit curves shift upwards, the
number of holistic firms increases while the number of Tayloristic ones remains
constant. As result unemployment declines.
7. Concluding Thoughts
Our analysis attempts to provide a new perspective on the organization of work.
The recent literature on the division of labor within firms (e.g. Becker and Murphy
(1992),  Bolton and  Dewatripont (1994), and Yang and Borland (1991)) focuses
primarily on the returns to specialization relative to the costs of co-ordination  across
workers. It shows, among other things, that as the costs of communication among
workers decline, the returns to specialization rise relative to the co-ordination costs and
consequently the division of labor within firms increases. Another branch of the
literature (e.g. Baumgardner (1988), Kim (1989), and Stigler (1951)) shows that as the
size of the market increases (due to, say, economic growth or the expansion of
international trade), the greater is the division of labor that it supports. Yet another
branch (e.g. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991)) shows how the division of labor within
firms depends on the degree to which performance on particular tasks is measurable and
the degree to which wages affect task performance. These contributions do not,
however, explain how educational achievements and recent technological advances -
particularly, the application of improved information technologies and the introduction
of flexible machine tools and programmable, multi-purpose equipment - may lead to a
reduced division of labor within firms. Our analysis has done so by examining changes
in the division of labor from the perspective of the intra-personal returns from multi-THE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     18
tasking, rather than the inter-personal returns from co-ordination of worker activities or
the incentive effects of wages.
In particular, our analysis has focused on how complementarities among tasks
can be exploited when individual workers use their experience at one task to improve
their performance at another task. In practice, this phenomenon - versatility across tasks,
the ability to combine different tasks in meeting a customer's needs, the ability to apply
the knowledge gained at one task to improve productivity at another task - can take on a
wide variety of forms. There are abundant examples of this: the use of customer
information gained from sales activities to improve product design, the use of
technological information gained from production activities to improve financial
accounting practices, the use of employee information gained from training activities to
improve work practices, work rotation on the shop floor among blue-collar workers, and
so on. The literature on organizational restructuring (cited in Section 2) suggests that
nowadays this phenomenon plays an increasingly important role in the restructuring of
work. In this context the introduction of new computer technologies and versatile
capital equipment can enhance inter-task complementarities and thereby lead to a
decline in the division of labor within firms.
In this context, the paper has examined the implications of these changes in the
market for organizations and the labor market. In effect, the above changes in the
division of labor “resegment” the labor market, raising the earnings versatile workers
relative to non-versatile ones. Our analysis indicates that when the restructuring
constraint is binding, the developments above initially lead to a “restructuring phase,” in
which some Tayloristic organizations are transformed into holistic ones and
unemployment expands. The result is rising labor market segmentation in the sense of
greater inequality of employment opportunities.  If the restructuring process is driven by
increases in informational and technological task complementarities or by reductions in
returns to scale, the wages of versatile workers rise relative to those of the non-versatile
ones. But if the process is driven by improvements in human capital that increase the
supply of versatile workers, the movement in relative wages in the holistic versus
Tayloristic sectors depends on the degree to which the supply of versatile workers
increases relative to the holistic labor demand.
Furthermore, our analysis shows that the restructuring phase is followed by an
“entry phase,” in which the holistic sector expands, the Tayloristic sector stops
contracting, and unemployment falls. In contrast to the increasing labor marketTHE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     19
segmentation in the restructuring phase, the entry phase is characterized by less labor
market segmentation, since the holistic sector no longer grows at the expense of the
Tayloristic one. The analysis also shows that when the entry constraint is binding, the
developments above lead directly to the entry phase, without intervening restructuring
phase.
It is worth noting that the “general training” that leads to an increased supply of
versatile workers, potentially useful to all firms, has an influence quite different in our
model from that in the standard human capital theory. In the latter, general training
raises wages in all firms since it raises workers’ productivity all over the economy. In
our theory, by contrast, general training increases the supply of labor to holistic
organizations and thereby expands the holistic sector at the expense of the Tayloristic
one and reduces holistic wages relative to Tayloristic ones.
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Figure 2: The Labor Market EquilibriumTHE DIVISION OF LABOR AND THE MARKET FOR ORGANIZATIONS     23
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Figure 4: Restructuring versus EntryA1
Appendix A: Determinants of Work Organization Appendix A: Determinants of Work Organization
The profitability of a marginal reallocation of the workers’ time across tasks is






and the rate of increasing or decreasing returns to the marginal time reallocation is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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    (A2)
When workers are completely versatile condition (A2) reduces to
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   (A3)
When the marginal products of labor are constant ( 0 ij e =  for i, j = 1,2),
condition (A3) becomes
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Appendix B: The Labor Market Appendix B: The Labor Market
For algebraic simplicity, but without loss of generality, we assume constant
returns to labor ( 1122  and  ffff ==  are constants) and suppose that each firm faces a
resource cost  ( ) ii n y  in conjunction with type-1 labor and  ( ) ii N Y  in conjunction
with type-2 labor (e.g. capital services, training), where  ','0 ii y Y>, and
","0 ii y Y>, so that as employment rises, increasingly costly resources are brought
into use. Maximizing the profit function (4) with respect to the time allocation t, we
obtain the time allocation decision 
*
HH tt =  for holistic organizations and 
* 1 T t =  for
Tayloristic organizations. Maximizing the profit function with respect to employment
n yields the number of people employed in the Tayloristic and holistic organizations:
1
( ) iiii ngaw =- , where  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
******
111222 111 iiiiiii afscfsc tttttt =￿￿-￿+￿-￿￿-





                                                
1Since non-versatile type-i workers ( i=1,2) are equally productive as type-i versatile workers who
specialize at task i, the Tayloristic organization’s labor demand function for these two types of workers




The nature of the equilibrium in the holistic market depends on the demand for
versatile workers (given by the labor demand function gH) relative to the supply of
them (
S
H L ab =￿). There are two equilibrium scenarios, the first of which is
illustrated by point H in Figure 2:
•  If the demand for versatile workers is “small” relative to the supply, the
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(S1H)
  (where the first argument of the wage setting function is the unemployment rate of
versatile workers,  ( ) ( ) 1/
DS
HH LL -  and 
S
H L ab =￿).
•  If the demand for versatile workers is “large” relative to the supply, the equilibrium


















There are three possible equilibrium scenarios for the Tayloristic labor market,
depending on the Tayloristic labor demand relative to the supply of non-versatile
workers relative to versatile ones. The first of these scenarios is illustrated by point T
in Figure 2:
•  If the demand for non-versatile workers is “small” relative to the supply, the
Tayloristic organizations do not need to hire versatile workers (who demand a
higher wage than the non-versatile workers since their reservation wage is higher),
and thus only the supply of non-versatile workers,  1
S
T L ab =-￿, is relevant toA3
Tayloristic wage determination. Then the labor market equilibrium is given by the
intersection of the Tayloristic labor demand curve and the lower segment of the
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•  If the demand for non-versatile workers relative to the supply is in the
“intermediate” range, the Tayloristic organizations hire some, but not all, of the
available versatile workers. Thus the labor supply that is relevant to wage
determination in the Tayloristic market is 
* 1
S
TH LL =- , and the equilibrium is given
by the intersection between the labor demand curve and the upper segment of the
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•  If the demand is “large” relative to the supply, the Tayloristic organizations hire all
the available non-versatile and versatile workers. Then the equilibrium is given by



















The Labor Market Equilibrium and Labor Market Segmentation
A simple explicit solution for the labor market equilibrium may be obtained if
we linearize the labor demand and wage setting curves at the labor market equilibrium
point. (None of our qualitative conclusions depend on this  linearization, however.)
Specifically, for positive constants gH and gT, let the aggregate holistic and Tayloristic
labor demands
3 be  ( ) 2
D
HHHHH LFaw g =￿￿￿- and  ( ) 2
D
TTTTT LFaw g =￿￿￿-.
Regarding the scenarios in which the wage setting curves help determine the labor
                                                                                                                               
2 The equation number (S1H) represents “scenario 1 for the holistic market. By symmetry, the sum of
the aggregate labor demands for the type-1 and type-2 workers is equal to twice the aggregate demand
for the type-1 worker.A4
market equilibrium, let the holistic wage setting curve (when the labor demand is
“small” relative to the supply) be  ( ) /
oD
HH wLr dab
- =￿+, for a positive constant  d ,
and let the Tayloristic wage setting curve be  ( ) ( ) /1
oD
TT wLr dab
- =-￿+  when  the




+ =-+  when there is
an “intermediate” demand.
Then, in the holistic Scenario 1H (a “small” holistic demand), the equilibrium
employment-wage combination is
































Given these two alternative equilibria, the Tayloristic equilibrium employment-wage
combination in Scenario 1T (a “small” Tayloristic demand) is





















in Scenario 2T (an “intermediate” Tayloristic demand), it is









































1 HT MLL =--  workers who do not find employment in the holistic or
Tayloristic organizations remain unemployed and receive their reservation wage r = r.
In short, the labor market is segmented into a holistic sector, a Tayloristic
sector, and unemployment. It is on this account that the process whereby Tayloristic
                                                                                                                               
3Linearizing these labor demand implies holding constant the second partial derivatives of the output
function. Clearly, this still permits the existence of technological task complementarities.A5
firms are restructured into holistic ones has profound effects on labor market
segmentation.
For the linearized labor demand and wage setting equations, the zero profit
condition is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
***
2'0 HHHHHHHHHH fwawaw gygfq Øø ￿-￿￿--￿---= ºß (20Ha)
where




















￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ +￿￿ ￿￿
Łł
  (20Hb)
in the Scenario 1H and 2H, respectively.
The reorganization condition is
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
















H w  in Scenarios 1H and 2H is given by (20Hb), and
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in Scenarios 1T, 2T, and 3T, respectively.
A fall in the holistic fixed cost fH and advances in the holistic production and
information technologies - represented by increases in  aH - raise the profit from
restructuring into a holistic organization,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
****
2' THHHHHHHHHHTH fwawaw gygfr Øø P=￿-￿￿--￿--- ºß , relative to the
profit from remaining a Tayloristic organization,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
****
2' TTTTTTTTT fwawaw gyg Øø P=￿-￿￿--￿- ºß , from equation (21Ta).